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Abstract
Despite the apparent absence of external signs of consciousness, a significant
proportion of behaviorally nonresponsive patients can respond to commands
by willfully modulating their brain activity. However, little is known about the
mental life of these patients. We discuss a recent innovative approach, which
sheds light on the preserved cognitive capacities of these patients, including
executive function, theory of mind, and the experience of affective states. This
research represents a fundamental shift in our understanding of these patients,
and has important implications for both their continued treatment and care.
Moreover, this research marks out avenues for future inquiry into the residual
cognitive capacities of these patients.
Introduction
A proportion of patients who survive serious brain
injury are behaviorally nonresponsive or exhibit very
limited responsivity to commands administered at the
bedside by clinical staff. Some of these patients appear
to be awake, but show no signs of awareness of them-
selves, or of their environment, in repeated clinical
examinations. Patients with this behavioral profile,
specifically, signs of wakefulness – that is, periodic eye
opening and closing – in the absence of signs of aware-
ness of themselves or of the environment, are clinically
diagnosed as being in the vegetative state (VS).1 It is
well established that misdiagnosis occurs frequently in
this patient group, with up to 43% of patients being
diagnosed as VS, when they are, in fact, at least mini-
mally aware.2–4
In fact, studies using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) have demonstrated that despite the
apparent absence of external signs of consciousness in
repeated behavioral examinations, some behaviorally
nonresponsive patients can respond to commands by
willfully modulating their brain activity according to
instruction.5–14 These studies have established that a
minority of behaviorally nonresponsive patients (19%)
can use brain activity as a proxy for behavior to demon-
strate their conscious awareness.6,7
Despite these advances, the mental life of behaviorally
nonresponsive patients – particularly their capacity to
have similar experiences to healthy individuals in
response to everyday life events – has until recently
remained largely unknown. In the following sections, we
explore the extent to which current fMRI paradigms that
probe residual cognition shed light on this question.
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Consider the following (hypothetical patient) case: J is
a healthy 18-year-old female who suffered a catastrophic
anoxic brain injury. Upon emerging from coma several
days after her accident, J lacked any signs of behavioral
response to commands delivered at the bedside by the
clinical staff, and on this basis, was diagnosed as being in
a VS. Over several years, J showed no willful movement
to command, nor any behavioral signs of functional or
nonfunctional communication. She displayed no signs of
localization of sound and no visual recognition or inter-
action with objects or people in her environment.
Twelve years after her injury, J was enrolled in a highly
specialized research program, where she undertook several
fMRI tests. One of these tests instructed her to perform
two different mental imagery tasks. In two independent
5-min scanning sessions, J was asked either to imagine
playing tennis, or to imagine navigating the rooms of her
home. Depending on the task, J heard either the word
“tennis” or “house”– a reminder to engage in task-appro-
priate brain activation, and after 30 sec, J heard the word
“relax” – a reminder to stop task activity. No stimuli were
presented in the 30 sec following the presentation of each
command word, in order to allow J to respond exclu-
sively to the stated command, by engaging (or ceasing to
engage) in the requested mental imagery, and to rule out
the possibility that any observed brain activity could be
due to extraneous variables, such as external stimulation.5
When asked to imagine playing tennis, J’s supplemen-
tary motor area – the same region activated in healthy
controls during the same task5 – became significantly
active. Conversely, when asked to relax, the task-appro-
priate brain activity in this area ceased. Similarly, when
asked to imagine navigating around the rooms of her
home, J’s parahippocampal place area – the same brain
region activated in controls5 – became significantly active,
and when asked to relax, the task-appropriate activation
in this region ceased. These results suggested that J will-
fully followed the commands of researchers by purpose-
fully engaging in specific brain activity, thus,
demonstrating her conscious awareness. Furthermore,
these results suggested that despite the lack of behavioral
response, J retained several mental faculties that under-
lined her successful performance of the mental imagery
tasks. These included language understanding, working
memory, and decision-making and execution skills.
In order to ensure that any brain activity observed in
response to task commands cannot be caused by external
stimuli, “command-following” paradigms, of which
motor imagery is the best-established exemplar, employ a
highly artificial experimental context, and as such can
offer only a highly circumscribed picture of a patient’s
mental life.5 By using structured instructions, such as
“imagine playing tennis,” “imagine navigating around
your house,”5 “imagine swimming,”8 and “attend to the
word ‘yes’/‘no’,”10,15 to elicit willful modulation of brain
activity according to specific commands, these tasks can
only probe cognition within the purview of the particular
task the patient performs. However, the cognitive pro-
cesses engaged by these tasks are very narrow when com-
pared to the open-ended nature of conscious experiences
in day-to-day life, wherein the brain constantly sorts
through and integrates myriad inputs from multiple sen-
sory modalities. For this reason, the mental imagery para-
digm cannot address questions about the extent to which
behaviorally nonresponsive patients like J may consciously
process the dynamically evolving sensory environment
around them.
One such question involves whether these patients can
sustain attention to specific sensory inputs, while filtering
out irrelevant distractors, so as to coherently process
information coming from the environment. Similarly, it is
not clear whether any such patient can continuously inte-
grate the inputs of various sensory modalities into a uni-
fied whole in order to, for example, recognize the voices
and faces of familiar people, or whether they can integrate
knowledge stored in long-term memory with new infor-
mation, so as to understand complex, real-life events
unfolding over time. The answers to these questions
would help to illuminate the extent to which the con-
scious experiences of these patients are similar to those of
healthy individuals.
Covert Narrative Capacity
One recent approach16,17 provides just this sort of insight
into the mental life of behaviorally nonresponsive patients
who are covertly aware. Naci and colleagues16 investigated
whether similar experiences in healthy people are sup-
ported by a common neural code, which could be used
to interpret the conscious experiences of behaviorally
nonresponsive patients. In order to capture the open-
ended nature of consciousness, while still appealing to
common cognitive processes that could be empirically
measured, Naci and colleagues focused on the assessment
of executive function while participants watched a highly
engaging movie. Executive function – a high-order mental
faculty that is integral to our conscious experience of the
world – coordinates and schedules a host of other more
basic cognitive operations, such as monitoring and ana-
lyzing information from the environment, and integrates
it with internally generated goals.18–20 It enables us to
integrate prior knowledge with the current “state of play”
in order to make predictions about likely future events.
Engaging movies, which are designed to give viewers a
shared conscious experience, recruit similar executive pro-
cesses in different people; each viewer continuously
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integrates their observations, analyses, and predictions,
while filtering out any distractions, leading to an ongoing
involvement in the movie’s plot.
Naci et al.16 measured the brain response of healthy
participants and nonresponsive patients with unknown
levels of consciousness, as each individual viewed a short
movie in the fMRI scanner. The movie involved a young
boy who finds his uncle’s revolver, loads it with bullets,
and plays Russian roulette with it at home and in public,
unaware of its danger. In response to the movie, healthy
participants displayed highly synchronized brain activity
in sensory-driven auditory and visual areas, as well as in
frontal and parietal regions known to support executive
function.19,21–26 Critically, the movie’s executive demands,
assessed independently outside of the scanner, predicted
activity in these frontal and parietal regions. To confirm
the similar experience of different participants, another
experiment assessed their subjective experience of the
movie’s suspenseful features on a moment-by-moment
basis. A third and independent group of healthy partici-
pants rated how “suspenseful” the movie was, from
“least” to “most suspenseful,” every 2 sec. The perception
of suspense was highly similar across different partici-
pants, mirroring the highly correlated brain responses of
controls who saw the movie in the scanner. Together,
these results suggested that executive function in response
to the movie drove brain activity in frontal and parietal
regions, and further, that the synchronization of this
activity across individuals underpinned their similar sub-
jective experience. Thus, the degree to which each healthy
individual’s frontoparietal brain activity could be pre-
dicted from the rest of the group’s represented a reliable
indication of how similar his or her cognitive experience
was to that of others.
Naci et al.16 applied the same approach in behaviorally
nonresponsive patients with unknown levels of conscious-
ness in order to examine and quantify their experience of
the world in the absence of self-report. One patient, who
had remained behaviorally nonresponsive for a 16-year
period prior to the fMRI scanning, demonstrated a highly
similar brain response to that of the three independent
groups of controls (Fig. 1A–C). The patient’s brain activ-
ity in frontal and parietal regions – areas known to sup-
port executive function19,21–26 – was tightly synchronized
with that of the healthy participants who watched the
movie in the scanner. Importantly, the patient’s brain
response in the frontal and parietal regions was highly
sensitive to the movie’s executive load, as determined by
the second group of controls outside of the scanner,
which suggested that the patient had a similar conscious
response to the movie’s executive demands as the healthy
participants. Moreover, the patient’s brain response in the
frontal and parietal regions was also highly sensitive to
the healthy individuals’ subjective experience of the
movie’s suspense, as determined by the third group of
controls. This further supported the conclusion that the
patient had a similar subjective experience of suspense
during the movie as each and every healthy individual.
Sensitivity to the executively demanding and suspenseful
moments of the movie depended on covert narrative
Figure 1. Decoding executive function in one behaviorally nonresponsive patient. Healthy group: (A) Group-level auditory (purple) and visual
(blue) ICs. The healthy group’s activity predicted by the quantitative (B)/qualitative (C) executive measure (green) is overlaid on the group
frontoparietal IC (red); overlap areas are displayed in yellow. Patient: (A) The healthy group’s auditory and visual ICs predicted significant activity
in the patient’s auditory (purple) and visual (blue) cortex, respectively. The quantitative (B) and qualitative (C) executive measures predicted activity
(green) in the patient’s frontal and parietal regions. Overlap with activity predicted by the healthy group’s frontoparietal IC (red) is displayed in
yellow. Adapted from Naci et al.16
ª 2016 The Authors. Annals of Clinical and Translational Neurology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc on behalf of American Neurological Association. 63
L. Naci et al. Covert Narrative Capacity
capacity, or the ability to understand complex, real-world
stories that evolve over time.
Here, for the first time, we unpack the sophisticated
cognitive repertoire that underlies covert narrative capac-
ity, and discuss several inferences about the preserved
mental life of any patient who retains it. Some encompass
mental capacities that can be inferred directly from the
results of Naci et al.,16 while others require further
abstraction from the study data. Finally, we discuss the
ethical implications that arise from these inferences.
Visual and Auditory Function,
Including Recognition of Familiar
Objects, Voices, and Faces
Probably the most basic requirement for understanding
the plot of a film is the ability to hear and see what the
characters onscreen are saying and doing. Naci et al.16
found that activity in the patient’s auditory and visual
cortex synchronized to that of the healthy controls in
these regions, suggesting intact processing of both audi-
tory and visual information in the movie. Similarly, one
must be able to employ working and long-term memory
in order to identify certain characters from one scene to
the next, as well as recognize familiar objects and envi-
ronments critical to the plot. The fact that the patient dis-
played highly similar brain activity to the healthy controls
in both sensory and high-order frontal and parietal
regions while watching the film strongly suggests an abil-
ity to integrate auditory and visual information presented
in the film across these sensory modalities. This in turn
permitted an ongoing understanding of the film’s linguis-
tic content, as well as recognition of familiar objects,
voices, and faces of the characters.
Executive Function
In addition to the conscious processing of visual and
auditory stimuli, a critical component of following a
complex narrative in a film is the ability to integrate cur-
rent information with one’s prior knowledge and experi-
ences, to create a meaningful whole. This includes
relating events in the film to one’s experience of the real
world, in order to make predictions about the plot. For
example, a key aspect of the plot of the film used in Naci
et al.16 is the fact that the child points a loaded gun and
threatens to shoot na€ıve family members and other
bystanders. Understanding these scenes requires that the
viewers recognize the object as a gun, draw on their prior
knowledge (i.e., that guns can seriously harm or kill peo-
ple when fired), and infer that this gun might seriously
harm or kill someone if fired. Moreover, understanding
the plot requires sustained attention to relevant
information, while filtering out distracting elements.
These types of mental capacities are collectively referred
to as “executive function.”18 Evidence that the patient
responded to the executive demands of the plot in a way
that mirrored the response of healthy individuals, sug-
gested that he was capable of the range of meta-cognitive
mental processes that comprise executive function.
Theory of Mind
Another important part of understanding a complex
narrative is the ability to make inferences about the
characters’ mental states, in a variety of dynamically
unfolding social contexts. Because characters often do
not explicitly state their beliefs, desires, and intentions,
the viewer must rely on theory of mind, or the ability to
infer the mental states of others, and differentiate them
from one’s own.27,28 For example, the viewer must infer
the boy’s beliefs about the nature of the gun (i.e., that
he falsely believes it is a toy), as well as the beliefs of
other characters about the nature of the gun. Thus, the
viewer’s ability to comprehend the narrative depends on
their capacity to correctly attribute true and false beliefs
to the characters, in order to explain and predict their
behavior. Similarly, the viewer will often need to infer
the emotional state of a character in order to properly
contextualize their language or behavior. For example, a
character perceived as agitated or distressed while utter-
ing “don’t shoot” must be interpreted differently from a
character perceived as cheerful or insouciant while utter-
ing the same statement. The results from Naci et al.16
suggest that patients who complete the movie task are
capable of employing theory of mind to understand the
mental states to others. However, because the movie task
was not designed to assess theory of mind directly, any
conclusions regarding theory of mind capabilities of
patients remains tentative. Nevertheless, successful com-
pletion of this task provides compelling grounds for fur-
ther, direct investigation of theory of mind capabilities
in these specific patients. Such research may involve
adapting classic theory of mind assessments so that they
can be answered via neuroimaging-based binary commu-
nication paradigms.6,10
Morally Significant Distinctions
In addition to the aforementioned mental faculties, the
comprehension of complex narratives frequently relies on
“moral reasoning” or the process of determining whether
a particular action is right or wrong.29 Part of moral rea-
soning involves identifying particular features of a situa-
tion as being morally salient, so as to determine whether
a certain situation is morally problematic. For example,
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individuals capable of making moral distinctions might
recognize that it is morally bad to shoot a person with a
gun, whereas it is not morally bad – or at least, much less
so – to shoot a tree or a window. Consistent with this
view, healthy participants in Naci et al.16 demonstrated
stronger brain responses in frontal and parietal brain
regions – known to support high-level cognition19 – when
the boy pointed the loaded gun at other people (e.g., a
housekeeper), as compared to morally neutral objects
(e.g., a wall). Furthermore, healthy participants showed
even stronger brain responses in these regions when the
boy pointed the gun at his mother, as compared to the
other characters.
One interpretation of this result is that it reflects the
study participants’ ability to distinguish between entities
with and without moral status. It also suggests that par-
ticipants attributed a higher moral salience to the child’s
mother, perhaps reflecting an appreciation of the moral
significance of the familial relationship that was absent in
the character’s other interactions. Like those of the
healthy participants, the patient’s brain response was
highly sensitive to the plot’s moral implications, suggest-
ing that his experience of the film may have been shaped
by similar moral considerations.
Experience of Affective States
The narrative of movies by Hitchcock – the so-called
“Master of Suspense” – such as the one used in Naci
et al.,16 is largely driven by suspense, a complex affective
state involving excitement, tension, anxiety, fear, hope,
and anticipation.30 Conversely, the resolution of sus-
pense may be accompanied by positive feelings of satis-
faction, relief, or elation, as well as negative feelings like
disappointment, sadness, or anger.31,32 The complexity
of the affective experience that comprises suspense sug-
gests that study participants who experienced suspense
are capable of experiencing a variety of the more basic
affective states that underlie it. Moreover, most theorists
agree that a critical component of the experience of sus-
pense is the presence of a protagonist toward whom the
viewer has either a positive or negative affective disposi-
tion.33,34 The nature of the viewer’s affective disposition
toward a particular character, as well as the strength of
this disposition, influences the suspense which the
viewer feels about the unknown fate of the character;
the viewer hopes for a good outcome – and fears for a
bad outcome – for characters to which they are posi-
tively disposed.33 This suggests that study participants
who experienced suspense while watching the movie had
an affective disposition toward at least one of the char-
acters. By extension, any behaviorally nonresponsive
patient, such as the one described in Naci et al.,16 who
shows a similar perception of suspense as healthy partic-
ipants, may also have had a specific (positive) disposi-
tion toward at least one of the characters, as well as
being capable of experiencing a similar variety of affec-
tive states.
Reflection About Future States
The experience of suspense is supported by future-direc-
ted cognitive processes, including anticipation and pre-
diction about uncertain future outcomes.32 Indeed,
research suggests that the experience of suspense recruits
brain regions involved in making strategic inferences.35,36
In order to form predictions about future states of
affairs, an individual must continually incorporate her
prior knowledge and beliefs with new information as it
is presented. The fact that the patient reported in Naci
et al.16 was capable of experiencing suspense throughout
the movie suggests that he was capable of making infer-
ences about possible future states of affairs based on his
prior knowledge and contextual factors. This presents
the possibility that such a patient would also be able to
make predictions regarding his own future experiences.
If a patient is capable of conceiving of a series of events
as a cohesive narrative, or perceiving one event as fol-
lowing from another in a meaningful way, she may sim-
ilarly be capable of organizing her own experiences
according to a temporally coherent structure. Therefore,
rather than existing merely “moment to moment,” such
a patient may be capable of reflecting on and interpret-
ing the events of their own life in light of their past
experiences and potential future experiences. Of course,
while successfully completing the movie task strongly
suggests that a patient retains awareness of him or her-
self as persisting through time, it does not provide con-
clusive evidence that this is the case. However, further
testing of any such patient with neuroimaging-based
binary communication paradigms6,10 that enable direct
answering of questions about himself or herself would
be one way to establish the presence of self-awareness
over time.
Discussion
In summary, the successful completion of the movie task
can reveal a great deal about the conscious experience of
any behaviorally nonresponsive patient who harbors cov-
ert awareness. We have argued that evidence for covert
narrative capacity in a patient suggests preservation along
several dimensions of the patient’s mental life. These
include preserved visual and auditory function (including
recognition of familiar objects, voices and faces), execu-
tive function, theory of mind, and the ability to make
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morally significant distinctions, to experience emotions,
and to reflect about potential future states. Some of these
mental capacities can be inferred directly from successful
completion of the movie task, while others require further
abstraction from the study data and direct investigation
in future studies.
When compared to command-following para-
digms,5–14,42–44 the movie paradigm allows for much
broader and further reaching inferences regarding the
mental life of behaviorally nonresponsive patients
(Table 1). Furthermore, when compared to studies that
probe the brain at rest45–49 – and as such cannot shed
light on cognitive operations based on sensory input –
the movie task enables investigation of specific aspects of
a patient’s cognition that are inaccessible to resting-state
studies. Moreover, the movie task is highly efficient in
that it enables multidimensional assessment of cognition
within a brief 8-min arc of functional neuroimaging.
Brain-injured patients fatigue easily and fluctuate dramat-
ically in arousal over time.50 Therefore, the testing time
window is highly limited and a brief multidimensional
assessment is preferable to individual tasks. Additionally,
by mimicking real-world experiences, this paradigm
engages attention naturally and, thus, is less strenuous for
brain-injured patients51 than tasks that require compli-
ance with arbitrary instructions.52
Adoption Into Clinical Practice:
Opportunities and Limitations
In this review, we present proof of concept that behav-
iorally nonresponsive patients may retain a highly com-
plex mental life, even if they have been thought to lack
consciousness for many years. We argue that the identifi-
cation of the patient reported in Naci et al.16 makes the
case for further investigation of the preserved mental life
of patients who demonstrate covert narrative capacity,
and indeed, of any behaviorally nonresponsive patient,
because such findings would have important implications
for the patient’s standard of care and quality of life.
While many patients with disorders of consciousness may
be unable to complete the movie task, it is difficult to tell,
prior to scanning, which patients will provide a positive
response in the MRI scanner. Therefore, a relatively sim-
ple, low-effort, and time-efficient task like the movie task
is ideal for investigating both covert awareness and covert
narrative capacity of patients with disorders of conscious-
ness. Given the potential implications for patient welfare
of a positive result, we suggest that the movie task be
administered to any behaviorally nonresponsive patient
for whom there is an opportunity to do so.
For patients who show evidence of covert awareness on
the movie task, the fact that they may retain high levels
of preserved consciousness should compel us to redouble
our efforts to interact with them in an appropriate man-
ner. Research has shown that strong social networks can
promote psychological well-being,36,37 while the quality of
one’s social relationships is also a consistent predictor of
subjective well-being.38–41 Therefore, the knowledge that
patients may be aware of what occurs around them
should affect the interactions the families and clinical staff
have with the patient, and among themselves. Accord-
ingly, families, caregivers, and medical professionals may
be able to promote the welfare of behaviorally nonrespon-
sive patients who harbor covert awareness by ensuring
that patients are engaged in regular interaction with
others, for example, by involving patients in social activi-
ties, especially in ways that can enhance their feelings of
self-worth.
Furthermore, evidence of a highly preserved mental life,
especially with regard to the patient’s ability to anticipate
possible future states of one’s own life, reflect upon and
interpret the events of one’s past, and conceive of oneself
as an entity persisting over time, has significant implica-
tions for patient welfare. First, if an individual exists only
“in the moment,” as soon as a particular experience ceases,
it ceases to impact their welfare. Conversely, insofar as one
Table 1. Covert cognitive faculties of behaviorally nonresponsive
patients that can be revealed by fMRI paradigms.
Paradigm Task
Covert cognitive
faculties
Command-
following
Motor imagery instructions:
Imagine playing tennis;
imagine navigating;
imagine swimming
Language
Working memory
Long-term memory
Mental imagery
Sustained attention
to internal imagery
Selective attention
instructions:
Attend to the
word “yes” or “no”
Language
Working memory
Long-term memory
Selective attention
to external stimuli
Sustained attention
to external stimuli
Covert narrative
capacity
Movie watching
instructions:
Pay attention to
the movie on the
screen
Language
Working memory
Long-term memory
Selective attention
to external stimuli
Sustained attention
to external stimuli
Executive function
Affective experience
Theory of mind
Moral discrimination
Future-oriented
thinking
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can conceive of oneself as having a past and a future, the
effects of a particular experience may extend beyond the
end of the experience itself, including shaping future expe-
riences and coloring the interpretation of past experiences.
Second, the anticipation of future experiences (or reflec-
tion on past experiences) may themselves generate certain
emotions, such as hopefulness at the prospect of positive
future experiences, or anxiety at the prospect of negative
future experiences. These may in turn contribute to or
detract from an individual’s welfare. Third, the ability to
reflect on one’s life may allow these patients to possess
“higher order” interests, beyond merely pleasurable mental
states. Indeed, many of the sorts of goods that contribute
to individual welfare, such as, the development and
achievement of goals or personal projects, and developing
relationships with others, require a sense of oneself as a
subject persisting through time. This is not only because
the experience of these goods occurs over an extended
period of time, but also because the realization of these
higher order goods is not simply a series of discrete events,
but an iterative process, in which past experiences and the
anticipation of future outcomes interact to influence one’s
present experience.
If patients are capable of possessing these sorts of higher
order interests, this may present new avenues for enhancing
their welfare, as well as a compelling reason for working to
ensure that these interests are satisfied. Of course, covert
narrative capacity does not itself entail that a patient is far-
ing well; rather, it creates the possibility of a range of inter-
ests, the satisfaction or frustration of which may promote
or detract from patient welfare. It has been argued that the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is most consistent
with the welfare of behaviorally nonresponsive with covert
awareness.53 Further discussion of the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment would require a detailed, case by case
analysis of individual welfare, as well as an exploration of
the relevant regulations and policies which may vary signif-
icantly by region; such an exploration goes beyond the
scope of this article. We believe that our analysis of covert
narrative capacity is important precisely because it illumi-
nates potential avenues for promoting the welfare of
patients who may be experiencing a poor quality of life.
Further research is required to determine the sorts of inter-
ests, including higher order interests, these patients may be
capable of and how these interests may be satisfied, as well
as other cognitive capacities these patients may retain. Sim-
ilarly, because the ways in which we can promote patient
welfare are constrained by a patient’s residual cognitive
capacities and the experiences they are capable of,54 “inter-
mediate” cases, or cases in which a patient’s result shows
only partial similarity to that of healthy controls would
warrant further investigation, in order to best determine
the treatment or care most likely to benefit that patient.
A proportion of patients with disorders of conscious-
ness may not be able to demonstrate covert narrative
capacity, and indeed, clinical prevalence is the a topic of
current empirical investigation. It is likely that the deter-
mination of clinical prevalence will be susceptible to limi-
tations in sensitivity and specificity endemic to
neuroimaging-based assessment of mental content.55 For
example, of those patients who show negative results on
the movie task, a proportion will be false negatives, and
therefore, caution must be exercised when interpreting
such results in behaviorally nonresponsive patients.
A number of factors can cause a negative result on the
movie task: the patient might truly lack awareness, or
they might be aware but fatigued at the time of testing,
and thus unable to engage with the movie. A patient may
also be aware, but unable to understand the movie due to
impaired visual function, or because they are lacking
some other higher order faculties that prevent them from
understanding the movie. Unfortunately, it is impossible
to determine which of these factors caused the negative
result. Therefore, a negative result on the movie task does
not entail that a patient is entitled to lesser care or treat-
ment than would be provided to a patient whose cogni-
tive capacities remain unknown. For example, it is well
established that a proportion of chronic behaviorally non-
responsive patients have absent or impaired visual func-
tion,1 and patients in coma by definition have their eyes
closed.56 Therefore, some patients with disorders of con-
sciousness will not be able to process the information
presented in an audio–visual movie. To address this limi-
tation, an auditory-only naturalistic paradigm that is
highly similar to the movie task has been developed for
the assessment of executive function and other mental
faculties in these patients.17 Providing brain-injured
patients with naturalistic tasks that tap into different sen-
sory modalities will likely increase the chances of reveal-
ing spared cognition and reduce the rate of false negative
results.52
Caution must also be exercised when interpreting sig-
nificant positive results that do align with a priori predic-
tions in the movie task. Spurious positive results in
patients can sometimes result from neuroimaging analy-
ses, such as, for example, from the normalization of a
patient’s native brain space to the healthy controls’.57,58
However, the approach discussed here did not involve
normalization to a healthy template, nor did it constrain
the patient’s expected brain activity based on the localiza-
tion of the effect in healthy controls. Instead, the time
course of brain activity in healthy controls served to build
a strong prediction for the temporal evolution of brain
activity in the patients, should they retain covert aware-
ness. Drawing comparisons in the temporal domain
enabled direct relation of the healthy controls’ activation
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to that of brain-injured patients, while reducing the likeli-
hood of spurious positive results as compared to other
paradigms.17
Multimodal assessment of patients with disorders of
consciousness that combine behavioral testing with multi-
ple neuroimaging techniques, such as F-fluorodeoxyglucose
positron emission tomography (F-FDG PET) and fMRI,
will likely increase the sensitivity and specificity of deter-
mining a patient’s residual cognition and consciousness.59
For example, Stender and colleagues60 showed that F-FDG
PET had high sensitivity for the identification of patients
that had been diagnosed as being in a minimally conscious
state (MCS)61 according to the Coma Recovery Scare-
Revised (CRS-R)62 – the gold standard for behavioral diag-
nosis of disorders of consciousness – and that, indeed,
F-FDG PET results were highly congruent with the CRS-R
scores. Nevertheless, a patient’s covert awareness may be
missed by the behavioral CRS-R scale, even if careful
repeated tests are conducted.10,11 In some cases, fMRI has
shown an advantage over other technologies in being able
to detect signs of covert awareness that had been missed by
repeated behavioral assessments with the CRS-R.10,11
Despite its strengths, fMRI has a number of limitations,
including a high cost, lack of portability, and physical
impositions on some patients, that limit its widespread
adoption into clinical practice. Therefore, translation of
the naturalistic approach discussed here to cheap and
portable technologies, such as electroencephalography and
functional near-infrared spectroscopy, would render it
accessible to a broader section of patients63 and therefore
increase its future clinical utility.
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